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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
stances there is some question as to the soundness of the reasoning of the
majority opinion in determining that the sharing of counsel in the instant
case means that the accused was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
The petitioner's appeal on the ground of denial of his rights under the Sixth
Amendment was obviously a lawyer's afterthought.
Further, the decision is regrettable in the sense that it comes on the heels
of a recent line of cases in which the Supreme Court looked very much to
the realities in order to determine if the right to counsel had been denied.
In Poull v. Alabama's the Supreme Court went behind the record to
examine the background of the defendants before determining that they
had been denied the right to counsel since counsel had been appointed in
too haphazard a fashion and at too late a date to provide for adequate pre-
trial preparation, which is a fundamental part of the right. In a later
ease the Supreme Court held that a denial by the trial court of a continu-
ance requested by the defendant did not deprive the defendant of his con-
stitutional rights if it did not appear that such continuance would lead to
a stronger defense or lead the defense to obtain more witnesses.1" In a
matter involving the competency of attorneys assigned to represent the
accused the Supreme Court held that the failure of counsel to reserve cer-
tain exceptions was, at worst, according to the facts, mere negligence or
error of judgment and not a denial of the effective assistance to counsel. 15
This line of cases involved primarily the right to counsel as contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment. It may well be that the Supreme Court in
the instant ease arising under the Sixth Amendment is proceeding upon the
theory that "* * * constitutional privileges or immunities may be conferred
so explicitly as to leave no room for an inquiry* * *,,16 The dissenting
opinion in the instant case offers the better view, however, when it states
that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are not mere abstractions but
must be viewed objectively. Only by such treatment can their importance
be preserved and the guarantees be prevented from becoming hollow refuges
f1rom the law.
E. P.
CONTRACTS-CONTINGENT FEE Fop EXPERT WITNEss-[Missouri].-Plain-
tiff, a psychiatrist, brought suit on a contract providing compensation of
$26,000 for his services as an expert witness in a will-contest, payment of
the fee being contingent upon the success of that litigation. His services
consisted of reading depositions, hearing the testimony of witnesses, and
holding conferences with witnesses and counsel, upon which his opinion
also represented by one George Callaghan and himself. However, Stewart
was the most active defense attorney during the trial.
13. (1982) 287 U. S. 45.
14. Avery v. State of Alabama (1940) 308 U. S. 444.
15. Peterson v. State (1933) 227 Ala. 361, 150 So. 156, cert. den. (1934)
291 U. S. 661.
16. Snyder v. Mass. (1934) 291 U. S. 97, 116.
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as to the testator's sanity was based. At the close of the trial defendant
offered an instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, con-
tending that the contract was against public policy and void. The trial court
refused the instruction, and defendant appealed from that ruling. Held,
the contract was valid, and the mere fact that plaintiff's compensation was
contingent upon the outcome of the suit did not make it against public
policy. Barnes v. Boatme?'s National Bank of St. Louis.1
Contracts with an attorney for procuring testimony to be used in evi-
dence,2 or for procuring evidence of a given state of facts,8 on a contingent
fee basis have been condemned by the courts as contrary to public policy,
because they hold out inducements to commit fraud or perjury. However,
where the compensation is fixed the contract has been upheld, whether the
person employed is an attorney-at-law, a professional detective, or a mere
layman.4 A contract between a layman and a lawyer, by which the former
would secure clients for the latter in return for a share of the fee re-
ceived is, by the better view, void,5 but another rule holds that the parties
are not in pari delicto, and the layman may enforce the contract.
1. (Mo. 1941) 156 S. W. (2d) 597.
2. Goodrich v. Tenney (1893) 144 Ill. 422, 33 N. E. 44, 19 L. R. A. 371,
36 Am. St. Rep. 459; Sherman v. Burton (1911) 165 Mich. 293, 130 N. W.
667, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87; Hughes v. Mullins (1907) 36 Mont. 267, 92
Pac. 758, 13 Ann. Cas. 209.
3. Neece v. Joseph (1910) 95 Ark. 552, 129 S. W. 797, Ann. Cas. 1912A,
655; Harris v. Moore (1929) 120 Cal. App. 412, 283 Pac. 76; Gillett v.
Bd. of Supervisors of Logan County (1873) 67 Ill. 256; Haines & Lyman v.
Lewis (1880) 54 Iowa 301, 6 N. W. 495, 37 Am. Rep. 202; McMahon v.
Hardin (1929) 10 La. App. 416, 121 So. 678; Burns International Detective
Agency v. Doyle (1922) 46 Nev. 91, 208 Pac. 427, 26 A. L. R. 600; Welling-
ton v. Kelly (1881) 84 N. Y. 543; Lyon v. Hussey (1894) 82 Hun 15, 31
N. Y. S. 281; Gross v. Campbell (1928) 118 Ohio St. Rep. 285, 160 N. E.
852; Duteau v. Dresbach (1920) 113 Wash. 545, 194 Pac. 547, 16 A. L. R.
1430; Manufacturers' & Merchants' Inspection Bureau v. Everwear Hosiery
Co. (1912) 152 Wis. 73, 138 N. W. 624, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 847, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 449; contra, Wood v. Casserleigh (1900) 14 Colo. App. 265,
59 Pac. 1024, aff'd (1902) 30 Colo. 287, 71 Pac. 360, 97 Am. St. Rep. 138
(contract not invalid per se).
4. Lucas v. Pico (1880) 55 Cal. 126; Harris v. More (1886) 70 Cal. 502,
11 Pac. 780; Millen v. Coakley (1914) 217 Mass. 9, 104 N. E. 468; Haley v.
Hollenback (1917) 53 Mont. 494, 165 Pac. 459; Singer Mfg. Co. v. City
Nat. Bk. (1907) 145 N. C. 319, 59 S. E. 72; Cobb v. Cowdery (1867) 40
Vt. 25, 94 Am. Dec. 370; Wilkinson v. Oliveira (1835) 1 Bing. N. Cas. 490,
131 Eng. Reprint 1206; Yeatman v. Dempsey (1860) 7 C. B. (N. S.) 628,
141 Eng. Reprint 962, aff'd (1861) 9 C. B. (N. S.) 881, 142 Eng. Reprint
347; see also Chandler v. Mason (1829) 2 Vt. 193.
5. Meguire v. Corwine (1879) 101 U. S. 108; Alpers v. Hunt (1890) 86
Cal. 78, 24 Pac. 846, 9 L. R. A. 483, 21 Am. St. Rep. 17; Holland v.
Sheehan (1909) 108 Minn. 362, 122 N. W. 1, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 510, 17
Ann. Cas. 687; Langdon v. Conlin (1903) 67 Neb. 243, 93 N. W. 389, 60
L. R. A. 429, 108 Am. St. Rep. 643, 2 Ann. Cas. 834; Burt v. Place (N. Y.
1826) 6 Cow. 430; Lyon v. Hussey (1894) 82 Hun 15, 31 N. Y. S. 281.
6. Casserleigh v. Wood (1900) 14 Colo. App. 265, 59 Pac. 1024, aff'd(1902) 30 Colo. 287, 71 Pac. 360, 97 Am. St. Rep. 138; Dunne v. Herrick(1890) 37 Il. App. 180; Kelerher v. Henderson (1907) 203 Mo. 498, 101
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/10
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Turning from contracts for procuring evidence to contracts with wit-
nesses, we find that an agreement to compensate a lay (or fact) witness
in an amount in excess of the legal fees, where the witness resides within
the jurisdiction and is amenable to process therein, for attending as a wit-
ness and testifying only as to facts within his knowledge, is contrary to
public policy and void.7 Such an agreement being void, the fact that the
compensation is contingent upon the outcome of the suit seems immaterial.
8
If the witness, however, is not subject to the process of the court, either
because he is beyond the jurisdiction, or the court is not authorized to
subpoena witnesses, or the testimony is privileged, a contract to pay him
for attending and testifying has been upheld.9 The same rules apply to
expert (or opinion) witnesses as to testimony which they may be com-
pelled to give under an ordinary subpoena,'0 but agreements to compensate
them in a fixed sum for extra services are valid.11
The court in the principal case seems to put the decision upon the basis
of a contract to procure evidence or testimony, that is, that plaintiff was
S. W. 1088 (but holding at same time the contract with the client procured
by the layman champertous and void-an inconsistent view); Irwin v. Curie
(1902) 171 N. Y. 409, 64 N. E. 161, 58 L. R. A. 830.
7. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 130, §2202; Henderson v.
Hall (1908) 87 Ark. 1, 112 S. W. 171, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 70; Dodge v.
Stiles (1857) 26 Conn. 463; Walker v. Cook (1889) 33 Ill. App. 561; Wright
v. Somers (1906) 125 Ill. App. 256; Burchell v. Ledford (1928) 226 Ky.
155, 10 S. W. (2d) 622; State ex rel. Spillman v. First Bank of Nickerson
(1926) 114 Neb. 423, 207 N. W. 674, 45 A. L. R. 1418; Cowles v. Rochester
Folding Box Co. (1903) 81 App. Div. 414, 80 N. Y. S. 811, aff'd (1904)
179 N. Y. 87, 71 N. E. 468; Clifford v. Hughes (1910) 139 App. Div. 730,
124 N. Y. S. 478; Ramschasel's Estate (1904) 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 262; Pool v.
Sacheverel (1720) 1 P. Wms. 675, 24 Eng. Reprint 565.
8. Dawkins v. Gill (1846) 10 Ala. 206; Pelkey v. Hodge (1931) 112
Cal. App. 424, 296 Pac. 908; Keown & McEvoy v. Verlin (1925) 253 Mass.
374, 149 N. E. 115, 41 A. L. I. 1319; Bowling v. Blum (Tex. Civ. App.
1899) 52 S. W. 97; see Perry v. Dicken (1884) 105 Pa. 83, 51 Am. Rep. 181.
9. Gaines v. Molen (1887) 30 Fed. 27; Lincoln Mountain Gold Min. Co.
v. Williams (1906) 37 Colo. 193, 85 Pac. 844; Nickelson v. Wilson (1875)
60 N. Y. 362; Armstrong v. Prentice (1893) 86 Wis. 210, 56 N. W. 742;
Thatcher v. Darr (1921) 27 Wyo. 452, 199 Pac. 938, 16 A. L. R. 1442.
10. This is based upon the duty of a citizen to testify as to matters within
his knowledge when called upon to do so, and an agreement to pay him
more than the statutory amount is not only against public policy, but is
without consideration. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 130-137, §2203;
Burnett v. Freeman (1909) 134 Mo. App. 709, 115 S. W. 488; Collins
v. Godefroy (1831) 1 Barn. & Ad. 950, 109 Eng. Reprint 1040; see Dixon v.
State (1912) 12 Ga. App. 17, 76 S. E. 794; State v. Bell (1908) 212 Mo.
111, 111 S. W. 24; Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream Co. (1929) 108 W. Va. 184,
150 S. E. 539; contra, Stanton v. Rushmore (1933) 11 N. J. Misc. 544, 166
Atl. 707, aff'd (1934) 112 N. J. Law 115, 169 Atl. 721.
11. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 130-137, §2203; Tiffany v.
Kellogg Iron Works (1908) 59 Misc. 113, 109 N. Y. S. 754; see Johnson v.
Pietsch (1901) 94 Ill. App. 459; Barrus v. Phaneuf (1896) 166 Mass. 123,
82 L. R. A. 619, 44 N. E. 141; Burnett v. Freeman (1907) 125 Mo. App.
683, 103 S. W. 121; In re Schapiro (1911) 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N. Y. S.
862; but see Philler v. Waukesha County (1909) 139 Wis. 211, 120 N. W.
829, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040, 131 Am. St. Rep. 1055, 17 Ann. Cas. 712.
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hired to look up evidence on the question of the testator's sanity, and cites
cases accordingly.2 While the holding may be criticized as against the
weight of authority on that ground, 3 it is submitted that from the facts
given in the opinion this was rather a contract with an expert witness for
a contingent fee.14 The cases involving such contracts may be factually dis-
tinguished as contracts to pay an expert witness a share in the recovery 3
and contracts to pay an expert witness a stipulated fee contingent upon suc-
cess in the litigation.16 The courts have not attempted a distinction between
the two and have uniformly held the contracts invalid, because they lead
12. Bell County Bd. of Ed. v. Lee (1931) 239 Ky. 317, 39 S. W. (2d)
492, which involved a contingent fee contract whereby plaintiff employed
an auditor to audit a former sheriff's books, fee contingent on finding evi-
dence to be used against sheriff in trial-held, valid; Haley v. Hollenback(1917) 53 Mont. 494, 165 Pac. 459, which involved a contract between a
layman (defendant) and plaintiff whereby plaintiff agreed to search for
witnesses and testimony to be used in the layman's suit, compensation to
be contingent upon the layman's recovery in his action-held, valid (a
distinction must be drawn between contracts entered into by the party
litigant and contracts entered into by his lawyer-the former are more
generally upheld, see, in this connection, 12 Am. Jur. 690, §188); and
Gross v. Campbell (1928) 118 Ohio St. Rep. 285, 160 N. E. 852, which was
a contract whereby plaintiff agreed to procure evidence regarding defraud-
ing employees and others in defendant's company, compensation to be one-
half of the amount recovered from the wrongdoers, held, invalid (case im-
properly cited by Missouri court).
13. For cases on this point, see notes 2, 3, above.
14. From the opinion (156 S. W. (2d) 597, 600) it is noted that plain-
tiff's services consisted of appearing as a witness, preparing himself for
that task, and advising the attorneys during the various trials-but no-
where is it apparent that plaintiff procured evidence, unless conferring with
counsel can be so understood.
15. Von Kesler v. Baker (1933) 131 Cal. App. 654, 21 P. (2d) 1017
(contract for payment of 25 per cent. of recovery or 20 per cent. of settle-
ment to expert witness for testimony-held, void); Thomas v. Caulkett(1885) 57 Mich. 302, 24 N. W. 154, 58 Am. Rep. 369 (physician to testify
at meeting of parties to make settlement, in return for a share of the
amount recovered, held, void); Sherman v. Burton (1911) 165 Mich. 293,
130 N. W. 667, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87 (physician to testify in personal
injury claim in return for % of recovery, held, void); In re Certain Lands(1911) 144 App. Div. 107, 128 N. Y. S. 999, aff'd In re City of New York
(1912) 204 N. Y. 625, 97 N. E. 1103 (corporation contracted to provide
expert witnesses for % of recovery, held, void) ; In re Schapiro (1911) 144
App. Div. 1, 128 N. Y. S. 852 (disbarment proceeding against attorney who
made such a contract, held, void); Davis v. Smoot (1918) 176 N. C. 538,
97 S. E. 488 (contract whereby physician agreed to testify favorably for
plaintiff in personal injury action in consideration of 20 per cent. of amount
recovered, in addition to fee as expert witness, held, void).
16. Pollak v. Gregory (N. Y. 1861) 9 Bosw. 116 (expert, in patent liti-
gation) ; see Wright v. Corbin (1937) 190 Wash. 260, 67 P. (2d) 868, Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1937)
95 F. (2d) 978, 982; Johnson v. Pietsch (1901) 94 Ill. App. 459, 460;
Stoedter v. Turner (Mo. App. 1921) 237 S. W. 141, 144. See also 6 Willis-
ton, Contracts (2d ed. 1938) 4852-4855, §1716; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd
ed. 1940) 130-137, §§2202-2203; American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law of Contracts (1932) §552(2) ; 6 R. C. L. 756-757, §§163-164; and
12 Am. Jur. 691, §188.
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to subornation of perjury, taint with corruption the atmosphere of courts,
or prevent the course of justice.
In the language of the Missouri court, to hold a contract for a contingent
witness fee invalid would "infer that a party litigant's testimony is false
because he is interested in the outcome of his litigation."17 It is suggested
that no such generalization could result from evidence submitted to sustain
a party litigant's case. There is the basic doctrine that no witness can be
disqualified from testifying because of his interest in the outcome of the
action. 18 But what court would deny that such an interest may be shown
to affect his. credibility? And surely the credibility of an expert witness
testifying under a secret agreement 19 for payment only in the event of a
successful outcome of the action should be open to attack.2 0 The issue is
not the effect upon the jury of such testimony, it is the public policy which
forbids an agreement to testify on that basis. 21 The reason given is a
non sequitur. Also the statement of the court, "Nor is there anything in
the evidence tending to show that respondent's testimony and advice was
not his honest opinion," 22 though acceptable as a fact admitted by the
demurrer, is beside the point. The basic flaw in such agreements is not
the harm done. Actual good might result, yet the agreement is void be-
ause of its subversive tendency. The formal effect of a demurrer does not
cleanse the fact admitted of its vice. R. S. S.
17. 156 S. W. (2d) 597, 602.
18. §1887,.R. S. Mo. (1939) reads, "No person shall be disqualified as
a witness in any civil suit or proceeding at law or equity, by reason of his
interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise, but such interest
may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility."
19. If the agreement is not secret, but the witness has a "known interest
in the controversy," there is an exception to the general rule that a con-
tingent contract for his testimony is invalid. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Overman Cushion Tire Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1937) 95 F. (2d) 978; Wellington v.
Kelly (1881) 84 N. Y. 543; Thatcher v. Darr (1921) 27 Wyo. 452, 199
Pac. 938, 16 A. L. R. 1442; cf. Gaines v. Molen (C. C. E. D. Ark., 1887)
30 Fed. 27; Smith v. Hartsell (1908) 150 N. C. 71, 63 S. E. 172, 22 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 203; Perry v. Dicken (1884) 105 Pa. 83, 51 Am. Rep. 181; but see
Cowles v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (1903) 81 App. Div. 414, 80 N. Y. S.
811, aff'd (1904) 179 N. Y. 87, 71 N. E. 468.
20. See Rules for the Government of the Supreme Court of Missouri
(1942), Rule 35 (39), which reads, "* * * Upon request by the court or
adverse counsel, the amount of compensation demanded or received by any
witness in excess of the statutory allowance shall be disclosed." While this
provides collateral protection against the possible evils of contingent witness
fees, it is not enough.
21. In Rice v. Wood (1873) 113 Mass. 133, a case involving another
type of void contract, the court at page 135 gives a very concise statement
of why some contracts are held void when it says, "The law will not only
avoid contracts the avowed purpose or express object of which is to do
an unlawful act, but those made with a view to place, or the necessary
effect of which is to place, a person under wrong influences, and offer him
a temptation which may injuriously affect the rights of third persons. Nor
is it necessary to show that injury to third persons has actually resulted
from such a contract, for in many cases where it had occurred this would
be impossible to be proved. The contract is avoided on account of its neces-
sarily injurious tendency."
22. 156 S. W. (2d) 597, 602.
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